Massachusetts Cannabis Testing: A Former Grow Worker on a Decade of Dirty Weed


A former Massachusetts cultivation worker on the peroxide baths of 2015, the testing lab regulators suspended for misreporting mold results and why contaminated weed can still reach shelves.

Editor’s note: Gregg Padula worked at the cultivation facility described in this essay and later reached a workers’ compensation settlement with the company. The company is not named in this piece and did not respond to a request for comment before publication. He subsequently worked at Northeast Alternatives and has done freelance copywriting for other Massachusetts cannabis operators. This article reflects his firsthand experience and perspective. High Times reviewed supporting materials provided by the author and submitted the piece for legal review prior to publication.

The warning came down the hallway before the inspectors did.

This was routine. The heads-up allowed us enough time to shuffle plants around, into rooms unknown to the Department of Public Health’s Medical Cannabis Regulation team. It was 2015, only four months into one of the earliest medical cannabis grow facilities in Massachusetts.

Plants were being cut, trimmed and lowered into 55-gallon drums filled with a stinging hydrogen-peroxide solution, so strong it burned and bleached any bare skin on contact. The room was crowded. The air was so bad that workers sneezed, grew nauseated and reached for inhalers.

That was more than a decade ago.

I entered the legal cannabis industry with glittery eyes, but I found myself in the darkest corner of the new arena.

Every morning for two months, I filled three drums with hydrogen peroxide mixes and rolled them into the hidden room. Two were a 2-to-1 ratio of industrial H2O2 and water; the third was tap water. Trimmers handed me trays of manicured flower, ready for the bath. We couldn’t move fast enough; it was endless. Submerged in the peroxide, I stirred mountains of bud until the fizz rose to a deep fry. Here and there, a batch significantly worse than others could bring the barrels to a rumble. Each batch would quiet after about five minutes. They then placed the flower in the water barrel and sent it to post-harvest.

It was messy. Treated colas were saturated and strewn along every surface, destined for the treads of a dozen sneakers, like vines gnarled in car tires. Slipping and sliding, I felt dizzy all the time. For years after leaving that room, I smelled nothing but fire.

At the time, Massachusetts’ medical cannabis industry was still young. Legalization was sold largely on the promise of replacing an unregulated market with a cleaner, safer, tested and closely monitored one. But behind the walls of some of the state’s first commercial cultivation facilities, workers were confronting a basic agricultural problem at an unfamiliar scale: mold.

In a 2017 complaint to the DPH, I described what I believed were “masking techniques” used before mandatory third-party laboratory testing. I wrote that employees came forward to report widespread fungal infestations in hot, humid cultivation rooms, while management tried to preserve crops rather than risk losing them.

I reported that facility administrators redirected the inspectors before they entered the treatment area. Whether DPH documented that moment the same way, and what inspectors actually observed during that visit, remains one of the unresolved questions.

“For years after leaving that room, I smelled nothing but fire.”

Gregg Padula

Early warnings

If you worked in legal cannabis during its early days in 2015, you likely remember the scramble for licenses and market share in what was still a medical-only industry. The “medical” side was rarely the real focus; for many, it was a stepping stone to recreational sales. In Massachusetts, most grow facilities were adapted from previous businesses, which often created serious challenges. Sheetrock walls couldn’t withstand flooded rooms when water was left running, and electrical systems weren’t built for cultivation’s power demands.

The industry was building the plane while it was already taking off. Oversight was minimal, and the DPH had been thrust into regulating cannabis production with no prior experience. Operators expanded too quickly, leaving a decade-long trail of consequences for those who believe, or claim to believe, it can still be brought under control. It was too much, too fast, with too little oversight and too much freedom to self-police.

I wasn’t the only employee raising concern

Former harvest supervisor Maggie Kinsella spoke about her experience working at one of Massachusetts’ commercial grow facilities for one year, including six months in a supervisory role.

“In October 2015, powdery mildew, a parasitic fungus, started appearing on the leaves and flowers,” she said. “People were out sick every week during the winter.”

One afternoon, she recalls, a visibly infuriated cultivation manager asked why people were out sick so much and whether they weren’t eating healthy.

“What do you mean? Why are people out sick?” Kinsella says she answered. “We sit in a windowless room with no proper air purification or ventilation, and there’s mold everywhere, stuck to the walls and in the ventilation systems. The whole building is sick.”

How do contaminated flower batches ever pass mandatory lab testing?

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Kinsella, who is sharply educated in almost every facet of this process, also explained: “Testing laboratories receive the product to be analyzed and a number. They do not receive any information indicating the origins of each batch, leaving yet another gray area about whether the samples could all be from the same batch. At the very least, the DPH (now the CCC) should be monitoring all test records, as this would quickly identify noncompliant cultivation facilities.”

CCC suspends testing lab over misreported mold results

Assured Testing Laboratories, a Tyngsborough lab that handled roughly 25% of the state’s yeast and mold tests between April 2024 and April 2025, was ordered to cease operations in July 2025 after the Cannabis Control Commission found that it had established a pattern of failing to accurately report those results.

Assured’s fail rate for yeast and mold was 0.05%. The statewide average was 4.5%, roughly 90 times higher, according to the CCC’s June 30, 2025 summary suspension order, which took effect on July 4. It was the first suspension order the commission had ever issued.

Photo by Michael Schiffer on Unsplash

The finding triggered a recall of 7,605 “packages” of product, 509 of which were still in the supply chain, according to the CCC. It was the largest recall in state history. Public demand to see what was on that list prompted the commission to publish a report identifying thousands of affected cannabis products.

In the suspension order, the CCC states:

“Respondent’s practice of misreporting Total Yeast and Mold under 10,000 CFU/g as zero or non-detect rather than the measured value falsely represents to the Commission, Patients and Consumers that there is no presence of microbial contaminants, and posed an immediate or serious threat to public health, safety or welfare.”

“Respondent’s failure to report test results showing contamination exceeding 10,000 CFU/g for Total Yeast and Mold, as required by statute and regulation, and its decision to report favorable retest results at zero or non-detect undermines the Commission’s ability to ensure compliance, and posed an immediate or serious threat to public health, safety or welfare.”

Initially, the document wasn’t particularly consumer-friendly. Products were identified primarily by category (flower, vape and other product types) and by the METRC numbers entered into the state’s cannabis tracking system. Members of the Massachusetts cannabis community quickly began analyzing that data, using the identifiers provided to link products in the report to their associated companies.

The lab did not stay closed. In August 2025, Assured reached an agreement with the commission: a $300,000 fine, a new chief executive and a two-year probationary period with results reported to regulators every two weeks. It reopened on September 15, 2025. The company has said it disagreed with the CCC about the suspension and some of the reasons behind it, and that it is working with a third-party auditor.

The Assured Case, by the Numbers

  • About 25%: Share of the state’s yeast and mold tests Assured handled between April 2024 and April 2025
  • 0.05% vs. 4.5%: Assured’s yeast and mold fail rate vs. the statewide average
  • 7,605: Packages of product recalled, 509 of them still in the supply chain
  • $300,000: Fine in Assured’s August 2025 agreement with the CCC
  • 1st: The commission’s first-ever summary suspension order

How the mold gets there

The Assured case exposed one way cannabis that should have failed microbial testing could make it through the system. But that leaves another question: How does a commercial grow end up with so much mold in the first place?

“There’s mold everywhere, stuck to the walls and in the ventilation systems. The whole building is sick.”

Maggie Kinsella, former harvest supervisor

After more than 17 years cultivating cannabis, indoors and outdoors, personally and at commercial scale, I’ve encountered nearly every version of a sick plant a grower can face. I’ve also learned that much of cultivation expertise comes from failure. You lose plants. You diagnose the cause. You correct the environment. And, most importantly, you learn how to keep the same problem from happening again.

Cannabis is susceptible to fungal disease, certainly. But there is an enormous difference between encountering powdery mildew and creating an environment where it can spread freely among thousands of plants.

The fact is, you cannot hyper-max out a grow facility with more lights, more employees and as many plants as will fit in the room until shutting the door looks like someone struggling to close a piece of luggage by sitting on it.

In a small garden of six to 12 plants, powdery mildew is usually manageable. I’ve treated it with soaps like Dr. Bronner’s or Lost Coast Plant Therapy, spraying for three days until the visible mildew disappeared. At around 50 plants, hand-spraying becomes physically grueling, taking hours to reach every leaf. Growers may turn to sulfur in a contained garden, sometimes using a vaporizer suspended above the canopy to distribute it throughout the room.

But now imagine 400 plants in one room, stacked on top of one another and covered in powdery mildew. Sulfur alone may no longer be enough. The next step is a more aggressive approach, and that decision often falls to those who stand to lose the most financially.

Plants need space

Neighboring plants should never overlap branches, or even touch, for that matter. Air needs to circulate through and beneath the canopy. A grower needs to inspect plants, reach problem areas, and identify disease before a few suspicious white spots become a room-wide problem.

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Commercial cultivation creates a powerful incentive to fill that space. More plants mean more canopy. More canopy can mean more flowers. But there is a biological limit to how densely cannabis can be packed before efficiency begins to undermine plant health.

Why experience matters

You can’t master cultivation from an employee handbook. You have to put in your 10,000 hours, preferably under a mentor. Experienced growers recognize subtle changes in leaf posture, color, moisture, airflow and smell that can signal trouble before a disease becomes obvious. Much of that instinct comes from having screwed things up before and understanding exactly what caused it.

In a medical cannabis facility, those mistakes carry greater consequences. The finished flower will ultimately be inhaled or consumed, including by patients. Putting thousands of plants in the hands of inexperienced employees introduces risks that no amount of corporate procedure can eliminate.

Workers carry pathogens

Before you get through the first controlled area, you may be putting on a hairnet, beard net, lab coat and my personal favorite: those disposable little shoe covers that make everyone look as though they’re about to enter an operating room.

In theory, the logic is sound. But I’ve watched those disposable booties begin to disintegrate after a few steps. Look down in 10 minutes, and you’re almost guaranteed to find little left but the elastic bands that once secured them to your ankles.

Shoes, clothing, hair, tools and equipment can all carry contaminants into a cultivation facility. But no hairnet at the front door changes the fact that every additional person or object moving through the building creates another opportunity for pathogens to spread.

A perpetual heat wave

High-pressure sodium (HPS) lamps were long the dominant technology for indoor flowering, and they produce intense light and serious heat. Anyone who has spent hours working beneath a room full of them understands the difference immediately.

Combine that heat with thousands of thirsty plants and an enormous irrigation system, and you’ve created a constant battle for environmental control. I’ve worked in rooms where the floors seemed perpetually wet, and the air felt like Massachusetts right after a summer downpour.

Then came the potency audit

In August 2026, the CCC released the results of its first shelf audit of THC potency on labels. Regulators pulled 63 flower products from 62 producers off retail and medical shelves and sent them to the state’s independent testing laboratories for verification.

Thirteen came back outside the acceptable range. That is roughly one in five.

What makes that number worth sitting with is the size of the target they were aiming at. Massachusetts considers a label accurate if the measured potency falls anywhere between 75% and 125% of what the package label states. A product labeled at 15% THC passes anywhere from 11.25% to 18.75%. Jeff Rawson, chair of the Institute of Cannabis Science, told MJBizDaily that many testing lab operators believed the process was too generous to fail any products at all.

One in five failed anyway. Thirteen producers were notified that products that came in at least 25% weaker than claimed would have to be destroyed, recalled and reformulated, relabeled or retested. Eight of them had sold flower labeled more than 30% above its actual potency.

The CCC’s first THC potency audit (August 2026)
Flower products tested 63, from 62 producers
Acceptable range 75% to 125% of the label claim
Example: product labeled 15% THC Passes anywhere from 11.25% to 18.75%
Outside the range 13, roughly 1 in 5
Labeled more than 30% above actual potency 8
Source: Massachusetts Cannabis Control Commission, Boston Globe

While not associated with product contamination, I believe the audit points to the same larger problem: an industry willing to stretch the truth until regulators catch up. Whether it’s inflated THC potency or contaminated products, consumers are left depending on a system that doesn’t always catch the problem before the product reaches the shelf.

What happens to contaminated cannabis today?

That is the question workers asked ten years ago. Back then, I watched cannabis disappear beneath the surface of drums filled with hydrogen-peroxide solution. Today, the technology is different.

None of the current or former Massachusetts cultivation workers I spoke with for this story described the old practice of manually dunking entire plants in peroxide as commonplace today. Not because mold has lessened. The technology for remediating cannabis has evolved to include devices such as TheBOX, a chamber-based purification system designed to reduce microbial contamination. A far cry from the days of slam dunking plants by hand.

A contaminated crop still represents lost inventory. Lost inventory means lost revenue, which creates an enormous incentive to find a way to save it. This will never change.

When workers raised these concerns in Massachusetts’ early medical cannabis industry, many genuinely believed they were helping build something better. They documented what they saw and complained to regulators. Some spoke publicly, even though they feared it could cost them their careers in an industry they had only recently entered.

The companies grew. Massachusetts cannabis became an enormous commercial industry. Regulatory responsibility shifted from the Department of Public Health to the Cannabis Control Commission. Laboratory testing became an industry in its own right.

Years later, I went looking for those people again. Most are gone.

The people left, the mold did not.

Gregg Padula reported on cannabis for Gannett’s Massachusetts newspapers and broke the peroxide-dipping story as a 2017 Dig Boston cover feature. Part 2 of this series will follow what happened to the workers who spoke out, where the lawsuits went, and what the Cannabis Control Commission says now.



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